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ABSTRACT: The aim of the present article is to describe the unique idiom of electronic music in the 
perspective of semiotics. The starting point of this reflection is an attempt at a definition of what elec­
tronic music is. It then moves on to questions concerning the explanation of the two main concepts of 
semiotics, sign and meaning. Here, the goal is to outline the general tendencies in interpreting these 
concepts in the context of Pierce’s theory of sign and in the context of other concepts utilized in the 
field of narratology, i.e. diegesis and mimesis; with the aim of transferring these interpretations to the 
field of electronic music. The important nodes of this reflection are illustrated with specific examples 
of electronic musical works. The article also explores the semantic and cognitive attributes of elec­
tronic music and the relationships between them. The understanding of meaning in electronic music 
is explained in terms of analogies between the characteristics of cognitive processing of the sounds of 
everyday life and sounds utilized in electronic music.
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Introduction
In order to examine electronic music in the perspective of semiotics 
suggested in the title, we must first answer the question as to how we should 
understand the term “electronic music” and the term “semiotics”. These under­
standings determine the range of this perspective and the nodal points of this 
reflection.
We know that today the use of the term “electronic music” seems to have 
become more pragmatic. According to this view, “electronic music” can refer to 
music that employs electronic musical instruments (generators of sounds) and 
electronic music technology in its creation (manipulations and transformations 
of parameters of sound). Therefore nowadays electronic music includes many va­
rieties and ranges from experimental art music to popular forms.1 By “electronic 
music,” one should understand here all the effects derived from the use of envi­
1 In this reflection popular forms of electronic music will be excluded. What is more, we 
exclude from consideration music in which composer employs additional means, such as lights, 
colors or stage movements.
ronmental sounds, ambient music, turntable music, digital sampling, computer 
music, electronic modification of acoustic sounds, and music made from fragments 
of speech. However, also during live performances conventional sounds can be 
modified in real time using electronics, e.g. microphones (electroacoustic music). 
The source of the sound of electronic music can be “anything from ambient noise 
to live musicians playing conventional instruments.”2
In turn, the term “semiotics” is increasingly the subject of lively debate not only 
among semioticians per se, but also among humanists, with musicologists among 
their number. Insight into the mechanisms responsible for making meaning leads 
us to the question: what is a “sign” in electronic music and also, consequently, what 
is the “meaning” in this music? Because of these questions, when reflecting on the 
subject of electronic music in the perspective of semiotics, the starting point will 
be an attempt to define the concepts of sign and meaning in relation to this music. 
One can also consider electronic music on three semiotic levels; relations between 
signs and the things to which they refer (the level of semantics), relations among 
signs in formal structures of this music (the level of syntax) and, finally, relations 
between signs and sign-using agents (the level of pragmatics). The complexity of 
these considerations is magnified by the lack of objective representation of elec­
tronic music, which makes it difficult to study. Therefore, as indicated by Jean- 
Claude Risset, this music “creates great difficulties for the musicologist who insists 
on carrying out rigorous, “objective” work.”3 What is more, an important issue in 
the overview of electronic music in the perspective of semiotics is the problem of 
communication between the composer of the music and the listener. If one can 
define communication as the process of transferring data and/or meaning from 
a source to a receiver, then that means that the receiver must decode the data, i.e., 
be able to distinguish the data as salient, and make meaning out of it. The first step 
to this decoding is the conscious perception of music. Perception not only provides 
us with knowledge about perception itself, as one of the elements — alongside 
memory and thought — in the process of cognising music, but is also a source of 
knowledge about music itself. Perception is a constructive mental process, which 
cannot be considered impersonally, if only for the reason that perception of music 
is dependent to a substantial degree on the listener’s level of perceptual “train­
ing.” Similarly, music cannot be cognised solely on the basis of its score, since its 
coming into being is closely connected to the activating of human memory and 
sound imagination.
2 Thomas B. Holmes, Electronic and Experimental Music: Pioneers in Technology and 
Composition, second ed. (London: Routledge Music/Songbooks, 2002), 8.
3 Jean-Claude Risset, “Foreword”, in Thomas Licata (ed.), Electroacoustic Music. Analytical 
Perspectives (Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 2002), xv.
Sign and meaning in electronic music
Yet before the appearance of electronic music, sounds, generated from 
musical material, had never been used in music for their own sake, but for the 
expression of something. It is commonly believed that the expression plane in 
music (the sounds themselves) and the extremely varied content planes are linked 
together. In turn, Umberto Eco recognizes any given sign as an element of the ex­
pression plane, from which it follows as a consequence that it must be correlated 
to one or more elements of the content plane.4 Bearing in mind that, according to 
him, the characteristics of a sign are that it can be substituted and interpreted, the 
conclusion seems clear — music is a sign.
Therefore, irrespective of the many varieties and ranges of electronic music, 
as well as sources and ways of generating sounds, it can be concluded that elec­
tronic music is a sign, because it is music — although not all would agree with 
that (?). However, this is music in which there is a dependence of the material 
on the vision of the composer, but also, conversely — the musical material per se 
has got the ability to inform the composer about the nature of a particular sound 
quality. The music makes itself concrete in the first moments of the juxtaposition 
of musical material, the forming of the mutual relationships in this material. One 
must remember that the musical material of electronic music is unique. What is 
important here is that the sounds of electronic music material are often generated 
by nature, or by human activity; that is to say, they are not related to the activity 
of instrumental music or language. These are anecdotic sounds. But there are also 
non-anecdotic referential sounds, generated by instruments or/and language, 
although — in electronic music — in the main they are electronically decomposed, 
transformed, destructured and/or amplified. According to Jean-Louis Di Santo, 
“non-anecdotic instrumental referential sounds belong more to musical or emo­
tional analysis than to an analysis of the meaning” because “their form is more 
important than denotation.”5 However, sometimes a composer can reactivate “the 
power of denotation and connotation of the instruments,” and then “these sounds 
enable composers to put notions together the same way they do with anecdotic 
sounds. Depending on the context and the intention put into the listening, they are 
interpreted either as referential sounds or instrumental sounds.”6 In this context, 
anecdotic sounds function on two planes (denotation and connotation), which can 
be simultaneously or separately used in music.
4 Umberto Eco, A Theory o f Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 48.
5 Jean-Louis Di Santo, “Referential Sounds, Symbolism and Semiotics”, in Proceedings 
o f the Electroacoustic Music Studies Network Conference Meaning and Meaningfulness in 
Electroacoustic Music, Stockholm, June 2012, accessed May 8, 2014, www.ems-network.org.
6 Ibid.
At this point one should also recall Eco’s remark about the meaning of signals 
or signs. He indicates that the meaning is not necessarily determined by whether 
they refer to actual objects, because the existence of objects to which signals or 
signs may correspond is not a necessary condition for their signification.7
Semantic paradigm
Consideration of the essence of sign and meaning in electronic music 
within the context of the semantic paradigm is not a subject that is often under­
taken in musicological research. Nevertheless two approaches to this matter seem 
very inspirational.
One of them is the explanation of the issue of sign and meaning in electronic 
music based on Charles Sanders Peirce’s sign theory.8 Generally, his theory as­
sumes particular relationships between a sign, an object and an interprétant. On 
the level of a sign he distinguishes a triad, the components of which refer just to 
a quality (a qualisigri) or to the materialization, an embodiment, of qualisigns 
(a sinsign) as well as to a sign designed to be a sign, which is a concept (a legisigri). 
The relationship between the sign and its object is also defined here by a triad: an 
icon — which is based on similarity, and can indicate a strict likeness {image) or 
show some parts of its object (diagram), and, finally, can also transpose the object 
into something else (metaphor); an index — which is directly related to its cause; 
and a symbol — which can be related to its object according to a law. Peirce also 
distinguishes a triad which determines the sign by its relation to the message itself 
(rheme, dicisign, argument).
Let us explain some of these relationships on the example of Karlheinz Stock­
hausen’s composition — Studie I I  from the year 1954. As is generally known, Stock­
hausen wanted to generate only the pure tones of a frequency generator, “ ‘pure’ 
notes without overtones.”9 He wanted each sound produced synthetically and thus 
separately determined in its details. According to him “The conscious organization 
of music extends to the micro-acoustic sphere of the sound material itself.”10 Thus 
the sounds of Studie I I  are the signs which are understood to represent its object 
merely in its character, they are the signs of qualitative possibility (rheme). Such 
a musical sign functions mainly by its morphology and additionally by connotation. 
On the level of the relation between the sign and its object Stockhausen used icons,
7 Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 3-9.
8 Charles Sanders Peirce, Ecrits sur le signe, (Paris, Seuil, 1978), translation from French 
to English found on the website: accessed December 16, 2012, http://www.helsinki.fi/science/ 
commens/dictionary.html.
9 Karlheinz Stockhausen, Texte zur Musik 2, edited by Dieter Schnebel. (Cologne: Verlag 
M. DuMont Schauberg, 1964), 23.
10 Ibid., 22.
or more strictly, images of sounds. They are used for their morphologies and their 
juxtapositions are used for formal or aesthetics reasons, but not for their meaning 
which leads to reasoning, or in order to show something real. The pure tones used 
here are the qualisigns, because they are the signs of qualities by themselves. One 
must remember that — as is indicated by Di Santo — “the concept of musical piece 
will never be materialized as an object but by the idea that the sounds that are heard 
are related to one another and create a sound architecture or a group of sounds that 
have to be listened to in a larger unit.”11 On a level that deals with the possibility of 
existence before any materialization and any reaction to this materialization (the 
syntactic level), Stockhausen has assumed a fusion of the pure tones into new, more 
complex sounds, in order that the individual pure tone components should not have 
to appear as separately audible and easily identifiable. Therefore, he built a scale 
in which the interval between successive steps consists of the interval of 5:1 (two 
octaves plus just a major third) and is divided into 25 equal parts. This scale differs 
from the traditional tempered tuning system, in which an octave consists of twelve 
segments. This is a situation where, if a context in which a sound heard is directly 
produced by the object that caused it, at that time an index sinsign will be turned 
into a legisign by a specific intention (that is to say the composer’s intention). The 
transformation is made possible because a sinsign can be both the materialization 
of qualisigns or the materialization of a legisign through its replica. But it is also 
important that Studie I I  is a composition recorded on tape. The opportunity of 
recording these sounds (the groups of pure tones) and reproducing them ad libitum 
by their decoupling from their cause (the generator) causes the index to become 
an image — the recorded sound is like the original one. In the case of electronic 
music, all actions such as filtering or mixing timbre, all modifications of qualisigns 
into a well identified sinsign, can be regarded as a legisign.
Another example of electronic music is musique concrete. The signs refer to 
reality and therefore the sign is a dicisign. For example, in Etude aux chemins de 
fer (1948) by Pierre Schaeffer, “concrete music” was created with real-world sounds. 
There are featured recordings of the noises made by trains running along railroad 
tracks. Dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent its object in respect of 
its actual existence. Referential sounds are placed one after the other (metonymy) 
to create a representation of reality and a linear discourse imitating the flow of 
time. This is music in which the musical sign mainly functions by denotation and 
additionally by connotation.
To describe the message itself Peirce has also used the term argument. Argu­
ment deals with the work based on the principle of replacement of one element by 
another that results from what was there before (metaphor/substitution). Musi­
cal signs function by connotation and denotation and can be substituted for one 
another in order to develop an idea until its conclusion. It seems that Telemusik
11 Di Santo, “Referential Sounds, Symbolism and Semiotics”.
(1966) by Stockhausen clearly explains this approach. According to the composer 
the recorded fragments are intermodulated on tape with electronic sounds and with 
each other to produce “odd hybrid-types” — modulating, for example, “the chant 
of monks in a Japanese temple with Shipibo music from the Amazon, and then 
further imposing] a rhythm of Hungarian music on the melody of the monks. In 
this way, symbiotic things can be generated, which have never before been heard.”12 
In Peirce’s sign theory rheme, dicisign and argument determine the semantic 
paradigm, that is to say the relationship between signs and the things to which 
they refer. In turn, intention/intuition, metonymy and metaphor/substitution 
constitute the syntactic level of electronic music, which is characterized by the 
relationship among signs in the formal structures of this music. An intention/intui­
tion in electronic music refers to the management of the quantitative choices (for 
example, the size of reverberation) or the qualitative ones (for example, the type 
of timbre). The metonymy management on the syntax level relies on the organiza­
tion of qualities alone (qualisigns) within the structure of their materializations 
(sinsign). A  metaphor determines the relationship of reference and substitution 
established on the basis of laws.
The second interesting approach to the meaning problem in electronic music is 
the standpoint in which the meaning is interpreted in the context of the mimetic and 
the diegetic aspects of this music. According to Anil Qamci, music, with regard to 
its temporal nature, acquires a narrative structure. As a consequence “The listener 
inevitably extracts a narrative from her musical experience due to the simple fact 
that a piece of music encapsulates a series of events between a starting point and 
an anticipated ending in the future. The extent to which the extracted narrative is 
concordant with the composer’s design does not impact its materialization. This 
narrative, however, emerges in the abstract realm of the musical sound.”13
However, one must note that electronic music uses anecdotic and non-an- 
ecdotic referential sounds “extending beyond the well-ingrained structures of 
traditional musical language” and therefore “this new material engages with the 
cognitive faculties of the listener, inducing a layer of meaning attribution amidst 
the continuum from material to affect.”14 A  listener’s musical behaviour proceeds 
according to a specific standard. Listening to an unfamiliar new musical material 
for the first time, a listener attempts to associate/match this material with his previ­
ous perceptual experiences, the effects of which he has assembled in his long-term 
memory in the form of cognitive schemata. If such association/matching fails, then 
the listener seeks new patterns for the information that is reaching him. Since the
12 Karlheinz Stockhausen, “Electroacoustic Performance Practice”, Perspectives o f New 
Music 34, no. 1 (Fall) 1996: 74-105, 94.
13 Anil Qamci, “Diegesis as a Semantic Paradigm for Electronic Music”, in Toronto Elec­
troacoustic Symposium 2012, accessed May 8, 2014, http://cec.sonus.ca/econtact/15_2/cam- 
ci_diegesis.html.
14 Ibid.
capacity of short-term memory is limited to a more or less constant quantity of 
perceptual units, and that limitation is independent of the quantity of information 
contained in each perceptual unit, the quantity of information that can be stored 
in that memory is determined by the way in which the listener forms a perceptual 
pattern from that information. If, while consciously listening to music, a listener 
recognises a pattern, then the quantity of perceptual units requiring further con­
sideration decreases. As a listener acquires auditory experience, information that 
originally occupied several perceptual units is patterned on a lesser quantity of 
units, and space in the short-term memory is freed for additional information. In 
this way, over time, the perception of music experienced many times over changes. 
The patterns that emerge from the sounds of heard music enable the listener to 
draw conclusions regarding the structures those sounds embody. Listener’s memo­
ries of previously observed sonic events remain as the references for processing 
new experience. Therefore, amidst the material’s ascent to affect, there emerges 
a mediating layer of meaning attribution, and a new continuum from material to 
meaning to affect materializes. The mediation layer of meaning attribution, in 
the case of electronic music, has got both abstract and concrete nature. During 
the conscious perception of electronic music, the listener superimposes semantic 
representations over her physical experience of the sounds, and her affective ap­
praisal of this music is imminently informed by this act.
We intuitively know that in electronic music there are various means that are 
used for the construction of narrative structures. Therefore, in this music narra­
tives take on new forms. In the context of the mimetic and the diegetic aspects of 
electronic music, one can say that its mimetic aspects occur in the spatial domain 
of its performance space. As Qamci emphasizes, “Electronic music presents to the 
listeners sounds that represent events; it does not speculate about — or recount — 
sounds.”15 Moreover during representing extra-musical events, the connotations 
of sound are evoked in electronic music. That means that this music isn’t narrated 
like — for example — poetry. At this point it is worth recalling that the diegetic 
aspect of poetry relies on the fact that the poet recounts events — speaking in her 
own person — as a narrator who is external to the immediate world of the story. 
On the other hand, the mimetic aspect of narration deals with an imitation of an 
event or a situation. In this context it seems clear that the more “abstract” (less 
anecdotic) sounds of electronic music material are less suitable for displaying highly 
representational qualities, which are needed in order to establish the intended 
diegetic aspect of this music.
In order to emphasize the nuances of the above explanation let us compare 
two musical works. The work by Francis Dhomont — Espace/Escape (1989) — 
combines the magnitude of the human experience of space. The sounds from 
different acoustic environments (from the flutter of the wings of a bird in a cage
15 Ibid.
to the sounds of the airport hall-steps, conversations, aircraft noise) are syntheti­
cally summarized in the complex, stacking formations that provoke a consider­
able number of descriptions, which mostly identify sonic events and sources. 
This is an example of electronic music, derived from the acoustic physicality of 
human life and discovering of the spatial dimensions of the sounds, of what is 
possible in acousmatic projection (for example, the dimensions of proximity and 
distance or the directions: front-back, left-right). In the work by Iannis Xenakis, 
Diamorphoses (1957), there are sounds of jet engines, car crashes, earthquake 
shocks, textures of sliding pitches, and other noiselike sounds, and sometimes 
they are contrasted with thin, high bell sounds. According to Xenakis, he wanted 
“to mix timbres in order to arrive at a body of sound like white noise; to study the 
evolution of timbres, dynamics and register; to make unisons with attacks only 
with or without transposition; to make chromosomes of attacks.”16 In turn Joel 
Chadabe with regard to this electronic music has noted that Xenakis “ [...] used 
recorded acoustic sounds modified by tape manipulations — changing speed, 
playing backward, splicing — and mixing, but without electronic processing such 
as filtering and modulation. His compositions, however, were not juxtaposed 
“objects,” as in normal musique concrète, so much as they were complex sound 
masses that transformed in time as the result of shifting distributions and densi­
ties of small, component sounds.”17 The perceptual results of Xenakis’s work can 
indicate a much more articulated sense of self. While in the case of the work by 
Dhômont perception assumes the role of an outside viewer who observes and 
reports the unfolding of certain events (i.e. “ ... has happened.”), for the second 
work, the common tendency is to reflect through the first person (i.e. “I felt...”). 
In this sense, the perceptual experience of the first work can be likened to that 
of a representational acting performance, during which the audience is situated 
outside the diegesis. The second piece, on the other hand, could be interpreted as 
possessing more presentational qualities, as the responses display further involve­
ment and a sense of being personally addressed.
Meaning in the cognitive paradigm
The nature of electronic music yields a distinct form of communica­
tion between the composer and the listener. The listener, as well as the composer, 
experience electronic music within a broader domain of cognitive associations to 
sounds. With the introduction of sounds that are not distinguished by the listener 
as being musical, the cognitive response to genre involves a distinct process of
16 Nouritz Matossian, Xenakis (London: Kahn and Averill, 1986), 125.
17 Joel Chadabe, Electronic Sound: The Past and Promise o f Electronic Music (Saddle River, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997), 34.
meaning attribution. Increasingly, it is emphasized that the ways in which the 
listener experiences meaning of electronic music are similar to the ways in which 
the mind constructs meaning in everyday life. Just as sounds perception in the 
world around the listener cannot be described via the traditional musical language, 
sonic events of electronic music display features that fall outside the vocabulary 
of this language.
There are some important observations on the perception of environmental 
sounds. It is believed that our categorization of auditive stimuli is based on semantic 
features rather than perceptual ones. It seems that the emergence of meaning in 
the everyday mind binds to the cognitive processes, which integrate experience 
from our multiple perceptual domains and forms a centralized understanding of the 
world around us. Listening, also listening to electronic music, gives rise to meaning 
as a direct manifestation of the everyday cognitive process of finding meaning in 
the world around us. An experience in one domain almost always invokes connec­
tions with another. In turn, electronic music certainly uses knowledge from other 
domains as part of its meaning.
It must also be noted that meaning varies within the context. And therefore 
there may be kinds of meanings that can be explained in common language and 
shared or they may seem more idiosyncratic and personal. Gary S. Kendall argues 
that “Sounds may take on particular meaning depending on their context. They 
can take on the role of opening, closing, marking boundaries, and so on. For ex­
ample, in Edgard Varèse’s Poème électronique a church bell has the role of being 
the opening sound. When it returns later, it has the role of closing a major sub­
section. Then, too, another source of artistic meaning is the highlighting of novel 
sounds in the context of the art work. For example, electroacoustic art can strive 
to bring the acoustic background into the foreground of the listener’s attention. 
These sounds could be unnoticed or simply inaudible.”18 One must also remember 
that ubiquitous contextual variation in meaning “is an inherent component in the 
meaning construction process.”19
On the other hand, the essence of electronic music is often the use of the 
purely sonoric properties of the sound material for artistic purposes. Listeners 
receive a certain message issuing from the composer effectively when they respect 
the rules for interpretating the semantic units contained in that message. Hence 
the communicational competence between a composer and a listener often boils 
down to the ability to recognise communicational situations and the composer’s 
selection of appropriate means for the creation of an auditively perceptible sound 
shape. This auditively perceptible sound shape results from the composer’s audi­
tory representations, which in turn reflect his thoughts, and influence the shape of
18 Gaiy S. Kendall, “Meaning in Electroacoustic Music and the Everyday Mind,” Organised 
Sound 15, no 1, 2010, 63-74, 65.
19 Seana Coulson, Semantic Leaps: Frame-Shifting and Conceptual Blending in Meaning 
Construction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 17.
the perceptual representations arising in the mind of the listener while consciously 
listening to music.
Electronic music is a difficult object of perception, because while listening to it 
the perceiver experiences the auditory images of highly complex musical structures. 
These produce highly complex and variable impressions, which for the listener 
may cause difficulties with perception. During the auditory reception of music, the 
listener makes a kind of selection of impressions, and extremely important here is 
the process of learning. The listener learns to differentiate the distinctive features 
of impressions. When a given piece of music is “heard through” many times, the 
ability to differentiate these features is enhanced, thanks to the process of learning.
Auditory perception is based on the identification and differentiation — through 
observation — of the sound images of heard music. The task of identification es­
sentially involves the listener seeking the mental representation of a given sound 
image. Differentiation, meanwhile, concerns the assessment as to whether two 
sound images derive from the same configuration of musical structures or from 
different configurations. Research into perceptual processes in respect of the iden­
tification and differentiation of sound images indicates that these are processes 
for which different areas of the cortex are responsible. We conclude from this that 
among potential listeners to a given piece of music there may exist different levels 
of ability to identify and differentiate its sound images. This is conditioned by the 
cortical properties of their brains, since there may arise certain anatomical differ­
ences between the two hemispheres.
The retention of simple information obtained as a result of sensory registration 
takes place in the store of sensory information, which enables this information to 
be kept in the cognitive system until the phase of emotional assessment and then 
the phase of the recognition of the content of the stimulus (perceptual categorisa­
tion). In perceptual categorisation, the listener seeks in his mind the category to 
which the incoming information is best suited. The experienced listener also effects 
a schématisation. Categorisation and schématisation are not mutually exclusive 
processes; indeed, they are mutually complementary, since the construction of the 
standard that serves as a model in memory recall is based on the memorisation of 
an ever greater number of the distinctive features of the heard music, which are 
employed in their integration into a schema. Cognitive psychology links catego­
risation with schématisation in the sense that it treats the schema as a part of the 
perceptual process, a part which — as Neisser states — “is internal to the perceiver 
[listener], modifiable by experience and somehow specific to what is being per­
ceived. The schema accepts information as it becomes available at sensory surfaces 
and is changed by that information [,..].”20 This reasoning contains the suggestion 
that there exists a certain set of innate perceptual elements, within which, besides
20 Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology 
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1976), 54.
the senses, there also exist schemata that control them. The schema, meanwhile, 
acts as a prototype for the classification of patterns into well-defined categories.
The everyday mind characterizes and organizes much of the activity in the 
world around us by utilizing the term event. This concept has quickly become 
a metaphorical way of organising and understanding the complexity of our au­
ditory experience and participates in the construction of meaning in electronic 
music — not only in relation to the listener’s understanding of single sounds, but 
also the understanding of groups of sounds and compositions as wholes. Universal 
properties of events can be captured in a cognitive schema.
The listener, in the phase of perceptual categorisation, makes use of a certain 
store of ready-made innate schemata and of schemata of “generalisation” em­
ploying prototypes which have the character of arithmetic means or modal values 
(the most frequently occurring images). In each case, the schemata, through their 
relative constancy and their connections with other parts of the auditory experi­
ence, enable the listener to recognise sound images which on the surface resemble 
nothing that the listener could have previously perceived.
In everyday life, the experience of events is interwoven with the flow of felt 
experience in its “distinctive qualities’: tension, linearity, amplitude and projec­
tion. The everyday mind relates the dynamics of energy flow to felt experience, an 
innate part of every listener’s feeling capacity and an intrinsic component of how 
the everyday mind experiences meaning. The embodied basis of such energy flow 
explains how listeners so easily relate sonic events to physical gestures. The felt 
qualities of experience are clearly recognised by listeners. According to Kendall, 
what is important here, is that “After the conclusion of an event, access to that 
event’s history is limited to what was bound to the event. [...] Often what is re­
tained is a general characterisation of the flow dynamics, a sense of the texture of 
the energy flow that could be captured with words such as rough, bumpy, grainy, 
smooth orflowing. When recalling the event, the listener may more easily retrieve 
an overall sense of the event’s energy than the pattern of its flow.”21
In the case of the perceptual categorisation of the sound images of electronic 
music (although not only), the role of invariants shaping a prototype maybe played 
by the repetitiveness of a particular configuration of sensory features, which deter­
mines the qualitative relationship among sound images (linked to such parameters 
of the musical work as performance means, articulation, the pitch range of the 
musical material employed, dynamics and agogics).
The organisation of memory and the limits to our capacities for remembering 
have a strong influence on the way we perceive, and consequently on the shape of 
sound images and their temporal boundaries. Memory affects the listener’s deci­
sions as to when given sound images or their configurations end and others begin, 
and also as to the way in which sound images are connected with each other in the
21 Kendall, “Meaning in Electroacoustic Music and the Everyday Mind”, 66.
mental representation of heard music. Elements of musical structures occurring 
50 milliseconds apart (which corresponds to a frequency of 20 sound events per 
second) accumulate, creating a level of blending of the sound events (often termed 
their “fusion”). In the auditory experience, this level is linked to the forming of the 
sensory features of musical structures, and the boundaries of this level result from 
limits as to the speed at which the neurons can process incoming information.22
The musical structures responsible for sound events occurring at intervals 
greater than 63 milliseconds participate in the second level of auditory experience. 
They are separately distinguishable, but are not so far apart from one another on 
the timescale as to cross the time limit of short-term memory (ave. 3-5 seconds 
per event). In the case of electronic music, these levels can be defined as levels 
of the forming of timbre and time patterns. Within the range of this level, there 
ultimately occurs the successive, simultaneous or successive-simultaneous group­
ing of elementary events endowed with particular sensory features. A proximity of 
pitch-range, of time, a similarity among the dominant sensory features, a common 
type of motion and a continuity to the flow of the music determine the integration 
of these events, which are subject to the above-mentioned criteria for grouping. 
The main difference between the level of grouping and the level of blending of 
events is that on the latter level the listener registers the boundaries between sin­
gle formed sound objects with specific sensory features, whereas on the level of 
grouping he registers temporally expanded patterns comprising numerous events. 
The difference concerns the timescale. The boundaries between events on the level 
of blending have an immediate character, not exceeding the length of ultrashort 
(sensory) memory, but at the level of grouping, the events are sufficiently extended 
in time that short-term memory is required for their perception. However, these 
temporal differences are not absolute. Moreover, the duration of the recollections 
from sensory and short-term memory may coincide.23 This is also the level of the 
forming of the listener’s sound images and the composer’s auditory ideas.
Configurations of the succession of sound images extended for a time exceed­
ing the limits of short-term memory create mental representations of music that 
refer to the formal level of its experience. This level of experience is most often 
described by the listener metaphorically, the metaphors concerning movement 
within a physical space. Movement in large physical spaces requires the use of 
long-term (permanent) memory. The listener says of groupings of sound events 
formed in this way that they are “earlier” or “later”, and describing the auditory 
experience he indicates that he becomes “lost” in the music, “finds himself in 
a particular place.” The formal level and its articulation are linked to the structure 
and limitations of permanent memory. In contrast to patterns existing on the level 
of grouping, in which short-term memory is engaged, segments or sections on
22 Bob Snyder, Music and Memory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 25.
23 Ibid., 31-45.
the formal level exist within a timescale that is too great for memory to be able to 
embrace them all “in the present”.
According to Kendall “Whatever the context, the demands of the moment 
often surpass the listener’s mental capacity to fully assimilate what is heard. But 
listeners are able to grasp the gist of what they hear, even when the details are 
too complex to follow. [...] Gist is a working sketch for meaning, a snapshot of 
essential relationships. In one sense gist enables the listener to keep up with the 
essentials of ongoing experience and in another sense it is a product of the lis­
tener’s understanding of what is essential in the current context. Gist separates 
foreground from background, the prominent from the inconspicuous. What gist 
does not generally include is a sense of outcomes or consequences.”24 Addition­
ally, broad sequences of events on this level do not automatically conserve their 
order in time. This order must be reconstructed — it is not a given characteristic. 
Thus for the links between the configurations of sound images on the formal level 
to be discovered, they must find their way, at least in part, into consciousness 
(by being summoned or recalled) from the permanent memory.25 Rapid auditory 
events in electronic music — similarly as sound events in everyday life — occur 
within a short time frame. In this case it seems that the gist guides the listener to 
the level of organisation that is the primary carrier of significance and meaning
— not the level of the individual auditory events, but the composite of the whole 
that is heard as a single event.
At this point, it is very important to realise that all the listener’s experiences 
from the above-described levels are temporally interconnected as they occur. In 
actual fact, the different levels of experience are no more than differences between 
individual ways of processing information in the memory. Therefore, as Kendall 
emphasises, gist and events are part of the listener” s meaningful understanding.
Also important in music cognition are memory processes which enter the 
realm of non-declarative memory (implicit knowledge, which occurs automatically 
and exclusively in such a context in which it was assimilated). These are priming, 
sensitisation and habituation.
With the effect of priming, each stimulus presented sufficiently early contains 
a trace that modifies the correctness and facility of the recognition of stimuli ap­
pearing at a later time. Priming acts bi-directionally, and so the identification of 
further stimuli can be made easier or more difficult.26 Sensitisation increases the 
attention devoted to stimuli which differ — be it only in some minor detail — from 
stimuli previously memorised. The memory has the chance to alter the information 
it contains. Habituation, meanwhile, is the opposite to sensitisation, as it involves
24 Kendall, “Meaning in Electroacoustic Music and the Everyday Mind”, 68.
25 Snyder, Music and Memory, 69-72.
26 Robert Sternberg, Psychologia poznawcza, trans. Ewa Czerniawska and Anna Matczak 
(Warsaw: WSiP, 2001), 69 [Eng. orig. Cognitive Psychology, 2nd. edn (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1999)].
the reduction of attention devoted to the analysis of stimuli that are already fa­
miliar.27 Although it does occur that one of these memory processes dominates, 
barring exceptional situations these processes mostly act together, responsible for 
the evolution of our memory.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in the creation of meaning in the cognitive 
paradigm, of importance are such contextual clues as the composer of the work, 
knowledge of previous works that have been heard, attitudes toward sonic material, 
and so forth, and also, the confrontation of the meaning in relation to the spatial 
idioms in audio reproduction, which are linked to the technology of electronic 
music, creating some unique possibilities for the artistic meaning.
Final remarks
Electronic music as the subject of musicological reflection is still prob­
lematic because there is no stable compositional theory which could reflect and 
guide the process of its cognition, also from the standpoint of the issue of mean­
ing in this music. Research dealing with electronic music has mostiy focused on 
a purely perceptive method based on listening as a means of comprehending 
a musical work, or, it aims at comprehending the genesis of the musical work and 
investigating compositional sketches, scores, different types of technological data, 
etc. Meaning in music has been a topic of discussion throughout the history of the 
art form. But the perspectives on the semantics of music manifested considerable 
shifts in focus over time; in particular, cognitive research in the field of psychology 
has yielded a growing corpus of new studies. Moreover, computational analysis 
exploits the computer’s ability to analyze sounds and recognize patterns within 
electronic music in a perceptually and musically meaningful manner. One must 
be aware that there are a number of specific ways in which a listener may experi­
ence the meaning in electronic music. The material and the language of electronic 
music diverge from that of traditional musical practice. Therefore it is necessary to 
adopt idiosyncratic approaches towards this music that will take into account the 
creation of meaning attribution on both the compositional and analytical levels.
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